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The flypaper effect results when a dollar of exogenous grants-in-aid leads to significantly greater public
spending than an equivalent dollar of citizen income:  Money sticks where it hits. Viewing governments
as agents for a representative citizen voter, this empirical result is an anomaly.  Four alternative explanations
have been offered.  First, it's a data problem; matching grants have been mis-classified as exogenous
aid. Second, it's an econometric problem; exogenous aid is correlated with omitted variables leading
to a downward bias in estimates of income's effects and an upward bias in estimates of aid's effects.
Third, it's a specification problem: the representative citizen either fails to observe lump-sum aid,
or sees aid but mis-perceives its impact as an average price effect, or finally, sees and understands
aid's budgetary effects but allocates "public" and "private" monies through separate "mental accounts."
The empirical evidence suggests none of these explanations is sufficient.  A fourth explanation seems
most promising: It's politics.  Rather than an anomaly, the flypaper effect is best seen as an outcome










Robert P. Inman 
In the late 1960's James Henderson (1968) and Edward Gramlich (1969) changed the
direction of empirical research on how local governments tax and spend.  While all prior work
detailed the demographic and economic correlates with government budgets, Henderson and
Gramlich sought an explanation for those correlations. As economists, the answer was clear.  Citizens
demand services from their elected officials, and elected officials respond subject to the availability
of government resources.  Resources came from citizen incomes and from fiscal transfers given by
the central government as grants-in-aid.  From this perspective, Henderson and Gramlich specified
and estimated demand equations based on the maximization of a representative citizen’s utility subject
to that citizen’s “full income” constraint specified as the sum of personal income and the citizen’s
share of his government’s unconstrained fiscal transfers.   So specified, personal income and the
citizen’s share of fiscal transfers should impact spending identically – money is money.
  The empirical analyses of Henderson and Gramlich revealed something unexpected, however.
An extra dollar of personal income increased government spending on the order of $.02 to $.05 but
an equivalent extra dollar of grants-in-aid increased government spending by $.30 to often as much
as a full dollar.  When Gramlich first presented his results, his colleague Arthur Okun called this larger
effect of lump-sum aid on government spending a “flypaper effect” noting that “money seems to stick
where it hits.”  The label stuck too, as has the puzzle of why intergovernmental transfers are so
stimulative.  Over 3,500 research papers have now been written documenting and seeking to explain1  From a Google search under the heading “flypaper effect.”  From the initial list of citations, I
deducted the 100 or so papers in entomology that really do study the effects of flypaper on insect populations




Why do we care about this apparent anomaly?  For two reasons.  First, as a matter of policy,
understanding how recipient governments spend intergovernmental transfers is essential for the design
of efficient fiscal policy in federal economies.  Second, as a matter of  science, understanding why
governments spend citizens’ incomes as they do provides valuable insights as to how citizen
preferences are represented in government policies.  The taxation of citizen incomes and the
allocation of grants-in-aid provide two “tracers” as to the inner workings of  political decision-
making, one (taxes) that is directly observed and controlled by citizens and the other (grants) perhaps
only imperfectly so. 
The benchmark for both the policy and political economy literatures is how a politically
decisive citizen would like to see government resources allocated, specified by the maximization of
that representative citizen’s welfare over private (x) and public (g) goods, indexed by U(x, g), subject
to a current period budget constraint specified as:
Y = {I + h•z} = x + pg•g
where I is the citizen’s private income (or tax base), h is the citizen’s share of unconstrained or lump-
sum intergovernmental transfers per capita (z) specified as h = I/¦ with ¦ equal to the average income
(or tax base) in the citizen’s political jurisdiction, and pg is the “tax price” for government services
(g) equal to cC(1 - m)Ch where c is the per unit production cost of g and m is the matching rate for2  This specification assumes taxes are imposed at a proportional tax rate, r, specified as: r = [c•(1-
m)•g - z]/¦. The citizen’s after-tax income for expenditure on the private good  will then be x = I - r•I .  The
budget constraint above follows directly, where pg = cC(1 - m)Ch.  More elaborate specifications of this
constraint allowing for interactions of price effects up to a limit – a variant of categorical grants – should also
be considered; see Lankford (1987).  
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open-ended matching federal aid.  Private goods cost $1.
2  Y is called the citizen’s “full income.”  The
citizen’s preferred allocations will be x = x(1, pg, Y) and g = g(1, pg, Y), where: 
)gI = (*g/*Y)C(*Y/*I)C)I = (*g/*Y)C()I = $1), 
for an extra dollar of personal income and: 
 )gz = (*g/*Y)C(*Y/*z)C)z = (*g/*Y)ChC()z = $1)
for an extra dollar of aid, implying that estimated marginal effects of aid to income should be related
as )gz/)gI = h.  In most political jurisdictions the representative citizen has a tax base (often specified
as the median tax base) less than the average tax base; thus, h = I/¦ < 1 in most cases.  If our
representative citizen has had her way, then we should expect )gz/)gI = h < 1.  The overwhelming
empirical evidence summarized by Gramlich (1977), Inman (1979), Fisher (1982), and Hines and
Thaler (1995) shows just the opposite, however; )gI  ranges from $.02 to $.05 while the companion
estimates of )gz typically fall between $.30 to $1.00.  Income to the citizen stays with the citizen;
grants to the government stay with the government. Money sticks where it hits. Why?
Four explanations have been offered.  First, the answer is in the data.  Researchers  mis-
measure intergovernmental aid by confusing matching grants that lower the marginal price of public
services (pg) with lump-sum aid (z) that shifts outward the representative citizen’s budget constraint.
Matching aid has a price effect, lump-sum aid an income effect.  For local politics controlled by a
representative citizen, consumer theory predicts a matching grant’s price effect will stimulate more
government services than an equivalent dollar of lump-sum aid.  If the dollar transfer received from4
matching aid is erroneously classified as lump-sum aid, then )gz > )gI will result; see Moffitt (1984),
Megdal (1987), and Baker, Payne, and Smart (1999).  Even after correctly classifying aid programs
and measuring pg and z appropriately, however, the flypaper effect remains; see for example, Wyckoff
(1991).
The second explanation sees the anomaly as an econometric problem.  Researchers may have
omitted important determinants of government spending likely to be correlated with citizen income
or intergovernmental aid leading to biased estimates of )gI and )gz.  Bruce Hamilton (1983) and
Jonathan Hamilton (1986) attribute the flypaper effect to mis-specifications of the technology or costs
of providing local services.  Bruce Hamilton argues estimated demand equations omit important
variables such as the citizen’s talents or willingness to volunteer that are positively correlated with
citizen income and also contribute to the provision of government services.  If these omitted effects
are substitutes for (negatively correlated with) purchased government inputs, then the estimated
coefficient for income will be biased downward and perhaps sufficiently so that )gz > )gI.  Jonathan
Hamilton suggests the misspecification arises from a failure to correctly account for residential exit
from high tax jurisdictions leading to a loss of tax base when specifying the price of government
services.  Local taxes are inefficient and the correctly specified price of local services must reflect this
fact.  If citizens tend to reside in localities of comparable income and higher income residents are
more mobile, then the representative citizen’s income will be positively correlated with the correct
price which is negatively correlated with government services.  Again, there is a downward bias in
the estimated income effect with )gz > )gI as a possible result.    
Neither of the Hamiltons’ biases are likely to fully explain estimated flypaper effects, however.
 A plausible upper estimate for )gI can be obtained as )gI = (*g/*Y) = gg,YC(g/Y), where gg,Y is the5
income elasticity of demand for government services and g/Y is the average rate of spending by
recipient governments.  This ratio for the U.S. state and local government sectors combined from
1970 to 2008 – the period used for most all studies – is at most .15.  Since most state and local
services are arguably necessities, gg,Y # 1 seems reasonable.  If so, then )gI #(g/Y) = .15 bounds an
unbiased income effect.  Since most estimates of )gz exceed .15, the flypaper effect remains.  
Perhaps then the explanation lies in an upward bias in the estimates of )gz?  Here the results
of four recent studies are particularly instructive.  Each takes advantage of a plausibly exogenous, or
“natural experiment,”  change in lump-sum national aid to state or local governments.  Gordon (2004)
uses federal legislation’s required changes in Title I education aid caused by state-level (exogenous
to the local budget) demographic changes before and after census years as her measure of exogenous
aid.  She finds strong evidence of a flypaper effect for local school districts in the first year after the
change in Title I aid – )gz = 1.00 – but that this effect evaporates after three years with most of the
new aid returned to voters as lower local tax revenues.  In contrast, Ladd (1993) and Singhal (2008)
find evidence for a significant and quantitatively large flypaper effect for U.S. state governments as
does Dahlberg, et. al. (2008) in their study of national aid to municipalities in Sweden.  Ladd uses
windfall tax revenues to state governments following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 as her exogenous
measure of aid, and estimates and )gz = .40 > )gI = .03.   Singhal (2008) uses outside revenues
received by state governments from a recent legal settlement with the tobacco industry as her measure
of z and finds )gz = .20 for spending on tobacco control programs compared to an estimate of  )gI
0 for income’s effects on the same programs.  Dahlberg, et .al. (2008) exploit a discontinuity in the
national aid formula that gives significant additional assistance to communities that experience more
than 2 percent out-migration over the previous ten years; communities just below the threshold6
receive no additional aid, those just above do.  The analysis includes community and time fixed effects
– there is no direct estimate of )gI – and they find )gz = 1.00 and no local tax relief.  Ladd’s,
Singhal’s, and Dahlberg’s estimated flypaper effects remain over time.  
The flypaper effect appears to be a real phenomenon.  As a third explanation then, perhaps
our model of citizen fiscal choice is misspecified.  First, voters may not understand the complexity
of grant programs.  Both Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979) and Oates (1979) conjecture the
representative citizen misperceives lump-sum aid’s income effect as an average price effect.  They
conjecture that the voter uses taxes paid per unit of services received – (pg•g - z)/g or pg - (z/g) – as
their estimate of the true marginal tax cost of government services, pg.  If so, lump-sum aid (z) will
impact spending as a price subsidy, and the estimated effect aid on spending will imply )gz > )gI.
Wyckoff (1991) and Turnbull (1998) test this hypothesis by including both pg and [pg - (z/g)] as
competing explanators of local spending.  They find plausible (negative) marginal price effects but
implausible (positive) effects of the mis-perceived average price.  Estimated flypaper effects are
comparable to those of previous studies.  From this evidence, it is unlikely price misperception
provides the explanation for the flypaper effect. 
Filimon, Romer and Rosenthal (1982) and Hines and Thaler (1995) provide alternative
versions of the voter ignorance hypothesis.  For Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal the representative
voter fails to see through the veil of government budgets; he does not know the level of aid received
by the local government.  For Hines and Thaler, the representative voter sees through the veil but
budgets using mental accounts; there is a “public budget” that is the responsibility of government
officials and a “private budget” that is the citizen’s responsibility.  Both hypotheses need a theory of
public budgets to explain )gz.  Hines and Thaler leave this an open question, but Filimon, Romer, and7
Rosenthal are quite explicit: Public officials are budget maximizers and therefore )gz = 1.  They test
their theory for a sample of Oregon school districts and cannot reject the null hypothesis that )gz =
1 for state education aid.  In Romer, Rosenthal, and Munley (1992) the authors’ replicate their
analysis for a sample of New York school districts and here the conclusion varies by the size of the
school district.  Large districts (> 20,000 students) show budget maximizing behavior and a full
flypaper effect: )gz = 1.  In smaller districts, however, the estimated aid and income effects are about
equal: )gz  hA)gI.   These results parallel those from Ladd and Singhal for larger state governments
and from Gordon for local school districts.  Together, this evidence is sufficient to reject a strict
version of the mental accounting explanation.  It leaves open, however, the question of why the
flypaper effect remains for larger governments. 
Here a fourth explanation for the flypaper effect seems the most promising: It’s politics.  This
approach assumes voters are informed and rational, but they do conceal their preferences when it is
strategically useful to do so.  Such strategic behaviors require the use of less than efficient institutions
for preference revelation such as majority rule or representative legislatures.  From this perspective,
the flypaper effect is a consequence of an inability of citizens to write complete “political contracts”
with their elected officials.  Consistent with the results of Ladd, Singhal, and Romer, Rosenthal, and
Munley, one might expect these contracting problems to be greater, and the flypaper effect more
likely, for large governments.  
Chernick (1979) and Knight (2002) offer specifications of a political contract between a donor
central government and recipient local governments as a way to understand the flypaper effect.
Chernick (1979) specifies donor-recipient contracting as an auction.  Assuming an exogenous level
of federal aid, local governments bid for the right to provide aided services by offering to share the8
costs of provision.  Beginning with the highest offer price, the central government selects recipient
local governments until its grants budget is exhausted.  The resulting allocation will equalize the
marginal contribution of each local government to the incremental benefits from the provision of the
local service.  Local governments with the highest valuations will provide more services and receive
more aid.  Chernick offers evidence in support of this prediction from the federal Water and Sewer
Grant program.  Importantly, any reduced form estimate of )gz for this program that did not account
for the auction that sets aid would be biased upward and imply a strong flypaper effect.
Knight (2002) specifies and estimates a model of political contracting for grants policy that
sets both the aggregate size of the aid budget and its allocation.  The budget is chosen to ensure its
passage and to maximize local constituent net benefits for the central government’s agenda-setter.
Again, the allocation process is an auction.  Legislators bid to be part of the winning coalition by
offering to vote for the grants budget in return for intergovernmental aid.  The agenda-setter picks
the smallest 51 percent of the bids.   He then sets his own grant award to maximize the net benefits
to his own constituents.  Those legislators whose state or local governments value the aided local
service most highly make the winning offers.  The result is again a positive correlation between grants
awarded and local spending.  Failure to control for this correlation will lead to an upward bias  in the
estimate of )gz.  For a statistically consistent estimate of )gz one needs instruments that both predict
grants (z) and are independent of constituents’ demand for the aided service.  Legislative institutions
that select agenda-setters independent of constituent preferences will serve this purpose.  Knight uses
the legislators’ tenures and majority party memberships as his instruments in his empirical study of
highway grants and state highway spending.  Least squares estimation of grants’ effect on spending
shows )gz = 1; instrumental variables estimation rejects that extreme flypaper result but cannot reject3  Knight’s (2004) own estimates of the inefficiency of highway aid is $.96 per dollar, but he includes
in this estimate  the inefficiency of under-providing assistance to the many states excluded from the majority
winning coalition.  Implicit in that calculation is an assumption that the excluded states cannot provide highway
services on their own.  The estimate above assumes efficient local provision in states not receiving aid. 
4  There is perhaps no more striking example of the benefits of such structural analyses of the aid
process than the work of Reinikka and Svensson (2003, 2004) on the allocation of Ugandan central government
aid to local schools.  Initially, only $.15 of each centrally allocated school aid dollar found its way into the local
schools; $.85 was “captured” by the district bureaucracy for its own use.  The problem was inadequate
information and weak local political organizations.  Reforms publicized aid allocations and empowered village
councils to monitor that spending.   The end results was to reduce district capture to $.15 per aid dollar – a
plausible administrative cost – and to increase local school resources by $.85 per aid dollar. 
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a partial effect (1 > )gz > h@)gI).  In a companion piece, Knight (2004) estimates that this agenda-
setting process for highway grants imposes an allocative inefficiency of $.40 per dollar of aid.
3   
Over the past decade, the devolution of economic responsibilities to lower tier governments
has become increasingly important, not only in formally federal states but in unitary states as well.
Central governments typically grant fiscal assistance to these local governments for the provision of
those services.  Knowing how grants will be spent is important for the appropriate design of central
government transfer policies.  Credible estimates of aid’s effects on local spending requires good
instrumental variables to predict aid, or ideally “natural experiments” providing truly exogenous
measures of central government assistance.  Knowing how money is spent as it is helps us to
understand allocative performance of intergovernmental transfers, given federal and local political
institutions.  Knowing why grant money is spent as it is is just as important.   Here the specification
and estimation of structural models of central government transfer spending and local government
allocations of transfer incomes are essential.  This information provides a basis for reforming these
important institutions.
4  
Once viewed as an anomaly, the flypaper effect should now be seen as a reality of fiscal
politics, and its study as an opportunity to fashion central government transfer policies and10
intergovernmental fiscal institutions that better reflect citizen preferences for local public goods.  R-1
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